


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DOCUMENT NO. 29
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ☒
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CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S B
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2010
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: 6 JUN 1980 REVIEWED: ☐

4 February 1960




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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

4 February 1960

DAILY BRIEF

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

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Sino-Indian Border Dispute: [Two non-Communist opposition parties in India, accepting rumors that Nehru is considering meeting Chou En-lai without insisting on pre-conditions, intend to make it as difficult as possible for Nehru to do so. Their efforts, both in Parliament and with the public, may minimize the effectiveness of any mediatory efforts attempted by Khrushchev during his visit to India between 11 and 16 February and delay the date on which Nehru would feel it politically possible to announce any plans for Sino-Indian talks.] [redacted] (Page 2)

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India: Almost complete returns in the Kerala State election place the Congress party, with a near majority of assembly seats on its own, in a strong position to control any coalition government formed with its Socialist partner. The increased

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[redacted] 25X1

percentage of popular votes won by the Communist party, however, indicates it still has a firm hold on the lower classes in Kerala and can effectively exploit any shortcomings of the new government. [redacted] (Page 3) 25X1

Watch Committee Conclusions: [The following developments are susceptible of direct exploitation by Soviet/Communist hostile action which could jeopardize the security of the US in the immediate future:] [redacted] 25X1

New incidents are probable along the Israeli-UAR Armistice Line, but neither Israel nor the UAR appears to be preparing for general hostilities.] [redacted] 25X1

Israel-UAR: [Only minor firing incidents reportedly occurred on 3 February between Israeli and Syrian forces. Local UN officials have ordered both sides to withdraw their military from the demilitarized zone; it is not yet clear, however, to what extent either has complied. UN Secretary General Hammarskjold had stated earlier that he intended to call a meeting of the UN Security Council if the parties failed to comply.] [redacted] 25X1

Kenya: [European delegates to the Kenya constitutional conference, which began on 18 January in London, appear disillusioned with "pro-African" views expressed by Colonial Secretary Macleod, and some may leave the conference. Rightist elements among the Europeans reportedly regard differences among the various Kenya groups as so great as to preclude agreement on a constitution. Moderate Europeans appear disappointed that their advocacy of only a gradual increase in the African franchise has not been supported by the Colonial Office. The present impasse suggests that London will have to dictate a constitution which, without satisfying any group fully, would be more acceptable to the Africans than to the European settlers.] [redacted] (Page 4) 25X1

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DAILY BRIEF

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

Indian Opposition Parties May Delay Sino-Indian Border Settlement

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[Leaders of the conservative Swatantra party and of the moderate Praja Socialist party in India apparently now believe that Prime Minister Nehru is considering abandoning his preconditions for negotiations on the Sino-Indian border dispute. These preconditions are that Peiping accept the McMahon line as the traditional boundary in eastern India and withdraw its troops from occupied territory in north-eastern Ladakh.]

[Leaders of both parties intend to make any shift in Nehru's public stand as difficult as possible. They plan to issue statements opposing any sellout of Indian territory, and they hope to debate this subject in Parliament after the new session opens on 8 February.]

[While Nehru, other members of his government, and Indian military chiefs reportedly are willing to exchange north-eastern Ladakh for a firm guarantee of the McMahon line boundary in Assam, their problem is how to avoid the appearance of ceding any territory to China prior to the opening of negotiations. Nehru's present position was reached in large part as a result of public pressure, and it will be difficult for him to abandon this stand without satisfying public opinion.]

[Khrushchev's visit to India between 11 and 16 February might provide Nehru with a face-saving formula for claiming that he had assurances that Communist China would agree to a reasonable settlement. The recently announced Sino-Burmese border agreement might also make it easier to convince the Indian public of China's willingness to make concessions. However, protests such as those planned by the Swatantra and Praja Socialist parties might weaken Nehru's hand and render ineffective any efforts made by Khrushchev.]

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Results of Kerala State Elections

Almost complete returns in India's Kerala State election give the anti-Communist coalition close to three quarters of the 127 seats in the state assembly. The Communist party has lost about half of the 60 seats it held previously. Seven former Communist ministers were defeated.

The Congress party, which will have a near majority of assembly seats on its own, is in a strong position to control the coalition government likely to be formed with the Praja Socialist party (PSP). Although it had been generally agreed that PSP leader Pattom Thanu Pillai would be designated to head any Congress-PSP government, the Congress party may now insist on naming its own leader as chief minister. In any case, these two parties--formerly bitter rivals--probably will be unable to maintain the same degree of cooperation while in power as they have in opposition to the Communists. Their task will also be complicated by Kerala's increasingly serious economic problems, such as unemployment and food shortages, thus making it difficult to improve on the record of past governments without heavy financial assistance from the national government to speed development programs.

The extent of the majority won by the anti-Communist coalition is a serious setback to the Communist party. Despite their loss of many seats, however, the Communists retained a sizable share of the popular vote, indicating they still have a firm hold on the lower classes and can effectively exploit any shortcomings of the new government. Communist leaders will point to their increased percentage of the popular vote as proof that the Communists have not lost any support in Kerala as a result of the strong agitation against the Communist government or because of the party's position on the Sino-Indian border dispute. This factor will lessen the damage to Communist prestige elsewhere in India.

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European Delegates Critical of "Pro-African" Trend
In Kenya Conference

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[European delegates to the Kenya constitutional conference in London appear disillusioned with "pro-African" views expressed by Colonial Secretary Macleod, and some may leave the conference. In an address on 1 February, Macleod indicated that eventually Africans might have the "predominant voice" in Kenyan politics. Ronald Ngala, the head of the African nationalist bloc at the conference, has conceded that Macleod's statements have gone "a very long way to meet the African demands."]

[The leader of the rightist United party has characterized Macleod's proposals to the conference as "totally unacceptable," but to date has stopped short of threatening a walkout. The Colonial Office position--set forth in closed session--appears to have had its greatest impact on Michael Blundell's moderate New Kenya Group, which had hoped to gain government backing for its position favoring a gradual increase of African participation in government but a sharply limited franchise.]

[In the absence of agreement at the conference, London may have to dictate a constitution as it did in 1954. Such an imposed constitution would probably not satisfy any group fully, but it would be more acceptable to the Africans than to the Europeans.]

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